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TEACHING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—ESPECIALLY THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE— TO 
EVERYONE BUT LAW STUDENTS 
BRIAN L. OWSLEY* 
I think most people contemplating the teaching of Criminal Procedure 
envision a scenario involving a classroom. While this thought is quite 
reasonable, it does not apply to me as I have not as of yet taught Criminal 
Procedure in a formal classroom. I want to teach the course, but so far my 
teaching in this area has been targeted toward everyone but law students. The 
goal in this approach, however, is to influence judicial decisions as well as 
public policy regarding my particular interest in the interplay between the 
Fourth Amendment and electronic surveillance. I am honored that the Saint 
Louis University Law Journal found what I have been doing worthy of 
consideration and inclusion in its issue on Teaching Criminal Procedure. 
I have been dealing with issues related to Criminal Procedure for the last 
ten years. In 2005, I became a United States Magistrate Judge for the Corpus 
Christi Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas where I first dealt with matters of criminal law and criminal procedure. 
Since 2013, I have been teaching law, but as I admitted have not yet taught 
Criminal Procedure. Instead of law students in front of a podium, I have 
focused on other students, including law enforcement officials, legal 
practitioners, judges, and legislators, with lessons mostly about the Fourth 
Amendment and electronic surveillance. 
Magistrate judges deal with all manner of applications for surveillance and 
investigatory purposes, including pen registers,1 and trap and trace devices;2 
disclosure of a telecommunication subscriber’s records or communications;3 
and search warrants.4 Moreover, they routinely sign criminal complaints5 and 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Texas—Dallas College of Law; B.A., 
University of Notre Dame; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; M.I.A., Columbia 
University School of International and Public Affairs. From 2005 until 2013, the author served as 
a United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a). 
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issue arrest warrants.6 These documents are typically presented to a magistrate 
judge by a federal agent or an assistant United States attorney. One of the first 
teaching experiences is to ensure that they understand the appropriate standard 
and file applications consistent with that standard. 
Pen registers are surveillance techniques that enable law enforcement 
officials to obtain a list of outgoing calls from a known telephone number from 
a telecommunications provider.7 Conversely, trap and trace devices enable 
them to obtain a list of incoming calls from a telecommunications provider 
based on a known telephone number. Because these are relatively low stakes in 
terms of the information obtained, the standard set by Congress to obtain 
authorization is also very low: when an application is filed: 
[T]he court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of 
a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States, if the 
court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court that 
the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.8 
Very rarely, if ever, would a presiding magistrate judge deny a pen register in 
light of this standard. 
An application for a telecommunication subscriber’s records and 
information can obtain a list of information about a cell phone subscriber, 
including the person’s name, date of birth, mailing address, payment method, 
driver’s license number, social security number, and information that locates 
the person to a specific location.9 It requires a standard that is higher than a pen 
register in that the official seeking the court order must “offer[] specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”10 
These two lesser standards are contrasted with that standard derived from 
and first enunciated in the Fourth Amendment: 
  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or 
 
 5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3. 
 6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(d). 
 7. Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 195 (2014). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2012). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2012); see also Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment 
Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 15 (2013) (discussing the various obtainable information). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.11 
In order to obtain a search warrant or a criminal complaint and arrest warrant, 
the law enforcement officer must demonstrate that there is probable cause that 
a crime has been committed. Whereas, a pen register or a § 2703(d) order both 
contain lesser standards falling outside the parameters of a Fourth Amendment 
search. Consequently, the only protections citizens have regarding those 
methods of electronic surveillance are what Congress deems appropriate to 
provide. 
Thus, there are essentially three standards magistrate judges may apply 
regarding applications for electronic surveillance. A problem with dealing with 
electronic surveillance issues is that courts have received very little guidance 
from Congress. One of the most significant pieces of legislation is the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) that addresses both pen 
registers and the release of subscriber.12 That statute was enacted in 1986 and 
amended by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act13 to 
ensure that telecommunications providers facilitated law enforcements’ access 
to electronic surveillance, and amended again by the USA Patriot Act.14 
However, ECPA has largely dealt with electronic surveillance based on a 
statute that was enacted just as cell phones were being authorized for consumer 
use by the Federal Communications Commission. 
From my perspective, the education of federal agents and prosecutors 
stemmed not so much from their lack of knowledge about the various 
standards in their applications, but instead mostly on their willingness to 
stretch those standards in inappropriate means. For example, an agent may 
seek authorization for the use of a cell site simulator, a device that mimics a 
cell tower and downloads all nearby cell phones that register with it, pursuant 
to the pen register statute. They seek to use the pen register statute because the 
standard is very low but ignore the fact that a pen register does not have much 
to do with the specific type of electronic surveillance that the application 
proposes, except for the fact that it concerns cell phones. When I received 
these applications based on the pen register statute, I would open dialogue with 
the assigned assistant United States attorney as to the statutory authority for the 
request. I viewed this chance to discuss the issue as an opportunity to educate 
the person about it. 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 13. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 
(1994). 
 14. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also Owsley, supra 
note 7, at 197–98 (discussing how the Act amended the definition of a pen register and the 
implications). 
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In one case, the request involved a cell phone that was being used by 
inmates in a federal prison pursuant to the pen register statute.15 My concern 
was that the statute did not cover this type of request. When I asked the federal 
prosecutor about the authority for the application, I received assurances that 
briefing would be provided. This was the mantra for a couple of weeks. Every 
time I saw the prosecutor, I would inquire about the briefing and was again 
assured that it would be forthcoming. Eventually, the prosecutor acknowledged 
that shortly after the filing of the application, prison officials located and 
seized the cell phone that was the subject of the application. Upon hearing this 
news, I informed the government that information solved the problem and 
denied the application as moot. However, I also explained that the original 
request would have likely been granted if the application were for a search 
warrant based on probable cause. 
About a year later, I had another application for a cell site simulator 
pursuant to the pen register statute, this time involving a narcotics trafficking 
investigation.16 I conducted an ex parte hearing regarding the application 
where I again asked for the statutory authority to support this approach. I was 
assured that a brief would be forthcoming the next day but, again, that 
memorandum of law was never filed. Subsequently, I denied the application, 
finding that the pen register statute was inapplicable and that any such request 
must be based on a search warrant consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
I had similar experiences in many respects with applications from federal 
prosecutors seeking a cell tower dump, which essentially permits law 
enforcement to obtain all of the records from the cell towers in a specific area 
during a specific time period in order to seek a criminal suspect. The 
government typically filed these applications pursuant to § 2703 as opposed to 
a search warrant. Because I concluded that these applications essentially 
sought to pinpoint the locations of the targeted individuals, I concluded that the 
appropriate standard was probable cause.17 
 
 15. Owsley, supra note 7, at 203–04. 
 16. In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a 
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see also 
Owsley, supra note 7, at 204–05. 
 17. Prior to publication, two separate circuit splits on whether obtaining historical Cell Site 
Location Information (CSLI) is a Fourth Amendment search have arisen and disappeared. United 
States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 573 F. 
App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc in part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, 624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015). A recent Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion 
provides an accurate description of the current situation: 
Although the Supreme Court has not considered the issue whether the government’s 
obtaining CSLI from a cellular service provider constitutes a search in the constitutional 
sense, a number of lower Federal courts have done so. Applying the third-party doctrine 
articulated in Miller and Smith, a majority of these courts has ruled that an individual has 
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After that first cell tower dump application, I had another assistant United 
States attorney approach me about authorizing a cell tower dump. During an ex 
parte hearing, I asked him whether the application that he had filed was 
essentially a cell tower dump. After he acknowledged that it was, I asked him 
whether he had read my most recent order denying a cell tower dump pursuant 
to § 2703, which apparently he had not. I suggested that we reconvene after he 
had a chance to read my decision. I explained to him that I would deny his 
application pursuant to § 2703 for the same reasons that I had in my previous 
decision.18 However, I discussed with him that I thought the application could 
be narrowly tailored in its request in such a manner as to satisfy a probable 
cause standard. Ultimately, he did re-file his application as a search warrant, 
and it was granted.19 I think these applications and the resulting order were a 
great example of teaching Criminal Procedure insofar as the proper standard 
was discussed, and ultimately a good outcome for both the Fourth Amendment 
and the government was achieved. Moreover, this assistant United States 
attorney went back and in turn educated a number of other attorneys in the 
office. 
Finally, while on the bench, I sought to assist other magistrate judges as 
well as learn from many of them through various means. Most notably, there 
would be formal and informal discussions with a number of them. In email 
exchanges, a number of them indicated that they were unaware of applications 
for cell tower dumps or cell site simulators. This lack of knowledge is 
particularly concerning to me as I fear that some magistrate judges may have 
had an application for a cell site simulator, but instead they just viewed it as an 
ordinary pen register application and granted it based on that statute’s low 
standard. This type of exchange served as the basis for teaching about the 
appropriate standards to be employed in such an application. Moreover, it 
influenced my decision that not only was the pen register statute inapplicable 
to a cell site simulator, but in the absence of any statutory basis for dealing 
with this new technology, the appropriate standard was to require the 
government to demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment. 
Since leaving the bench, I have focused my scholarship on writing articles 
about electronic surveillance and the Fourth Amendment.20 My target 
 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI because it is a third-party business 
record, and therefore the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 857–58 (Mass. 2014). 
 18. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 964 F. Supp. 
2d 674 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 19. See In re Search of Cellular Tel. Towers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 769 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 20. Owsley, supra note 7; Owsley, supra note 9; Brian L. Owsley, Spies in the Skies: 
Dirtboxes and Airplane Electronic Surveillance, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 75 
(2015), http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/113MichLRevFI75_Ows 
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audiences for these articles are not only other academics and legal scholars but 
also judges. Writing for judges is important because in my experience many 
judges do not always fully understand and appreciate the implications of the 
orders that they sign. For example, in seeking authorization for the use of a cell 
site simulator, not only does the government cite and rely on the pen register 
statute, but they are trained to use a form application and proposed order that 
appears very similar to a pen register statute.21 Given the low standard and the 
lack of familiarity or sophistication regarding some matters related to 
electronic surveillance, it is quite possible that some judges sign cell site 
simulator applications believing that they are just pen register applications. 
In addition to writing for judges, I also strive to write articles that influence 
criminal defense attorneys and impact their daily practice. Beyond, the articles 
that I have noted already, I have written regarding other Fourth Amendment 
issues22 as well as I have revised some articles specifically for a publication 
geared toward practitioners, Search and Seizure Law Report.23 These articles 
condense law review articles in a manner designed to be more useful to 
practicing attorneys, which in turn is critical for criminal defense attorneys to 
understand these new developments in criminal procedure. Given that many of 
the electronic surveillance issues are dealt with in an ex parte manner,24 these 
attorneys do not have the direct knowledge and experience that their 
prosecutorial counterparts do. In order to address some of the issues raised 
related to prosecutions utilizing electronic surveillance, defense attorneys need 
to understand these issues. Some are starting to raise the issues in motions to 
suppress evidence and other motions, but many still are not fully addressing 
the issues. 
Beyond scholarship, I have taken a number of steps toward teaching 
Criminal Procedure to other audiences. For example, I have also presented at a 
judicial conference and am working to present at more because this enables me 
 
ley.pdf [http://perma.cc/SX5C-35GA]; Brian L. Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing 
Trojan Horses, 48 AKRON L. REV. 315 (2015). 
 21. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES 
AND CASE LAW FORMS 166–70 (rev. June 2005) (form application and proposed order for a pen 
register, and trap and trace device); id. at 171–74 (form application and proposed order for a cell 
site simulator). 
 22. Owsley, Spies in the Skies: Dirtboxes and Airplane Electronic Surveillance, supra note 
20; Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing Trojan Horses, supra note 20; Brian L. 
Owsley, The Supreme Court Goes to the Dogs: Reconciling Florida v. Harris and Florida v. 
Jardines, 77 ALB. L. REV. 349 (2014). 
 23. Brian L. Owsley, Cell Site Simulators and the Fourth Amendment, 43 SEARCH & 
SEIZURE L. REP. (forthcoming 2016); Brian L. Owsley, Drug Sniffing Dogs and the Fourth 
Amendment, 42 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 37 (2015). 
 24. See generally Brian L. Owsley, To Unseal or Not to Unseal: The Judiciary’s Role in 
Preventing Transparency in Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 
CIR. 259 (2014). 
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to talk to and teach directly with a group that I want to reach. I also have 
served as a presenter or panelist at other legal academia conferences in order to 
share my views and thoughts with other legal scholars regarding the Fourth 
Amendment and electronic surveillance. Just as I rely on many of their articles 
and ideas to support my scholarship, my hope is that they will do the same 
with mine, which will in turn influence courts and public policy. 
I have also worked with legislators and their staffs to assist them in better 
understanding electronic surveillance and its constitutional implications. For 
example, I have spoken with legislative assistants on Capitol Hill about various 
issues. Moreover, I have testified before a state house committee regarding cell 
site simulators.25 
Finally, a group of people that it would not have occurred to me to reach 
out to before I started teaching is journalists. I talk with and assist them by 
providing background or quotations regarding a number of topics related to 
electronic surveillance. This has spread my views and concerns to an 
extremely wide audience in mainstream media outlets, such as the Washington 
Post and the Wall Street Journal, as well as more specialty media. The 
influence of the media should not be understated. For example, I write much 
about cell site simulators. When I started doing this a few years ago, there was 
little being written or discussed about these devices. However, more recently, 
the media has started writing about them, which in turn has generated 
significant interest by the public, and concern by politicians and courts. Some 
legislation limiting the use of cell site simulators without warrants have been 
enacted by state legislatures. This newly developed interest further enables me 
to teach about this issue as well as to promote public policy changes. 
As I mentioned, I hope to teach Criminal Procedure in a classroom to law 
students someday. However, I am very satisfied with the teaching of Criminal 
Procedure that I have been able to do in the last ten years. My hope is that 
some of the teaching has had an impact on the various target audiences and 
increased their knowledge about criminal procedure topics. That is what I 
would hope for in the classroom and that is what I hope for when teaching 
everyone but law students. 
  
 
 25. Hearing on Hailstorm/Stingray Type Surveillance Devices Before the H. Oversight 
Comm. at 46:50 (Mich., May 13, 2014) (testimony of Brian L. Owsley), http://www.house.mi. 
gov/MHRPublic/videoarchive.aspx [http://perma.cc/K882-3RSB] (follow “play video” hyperlink 
for Oversight, Tuesday, May 13, 2014. On most platforms, only the audio plays within the 
browser. Right click and download to play the video in a stand-alone media player, such as 
Windows Media Player). 
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